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THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUS OBSERVATION
IN QUANTUM MECHANICAL DESCRIPTION1
H. D. Zeh
Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik, Universita¨t Heidelberg,
Philosophenweg 19, D-69120 Heidelberg, Germany
Epistemological consequences of quantum nonlocality (entanglement) are
discussed under the assumption of a universally valid Schro¨dinger equation
and the absence of hidden variables. This leads inevitably to a many-minds
interpretation. The recent foundation of quasi-classical neuronal states in
the brain (based on environmental decoherence) permits in principle a for-
mal description of the whole chain of measurement interactions, including
the behavior of conscious observers, without introducing any intermediate
classical concepts (for macroscopic “pointer states”) or “observables” (for
microscopic particle positions and the like) — thus consistently formalizing
Einstein’s ganzer langer Weg from the observed to the observer in quantum
mechanical terms.
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1 Introduction
John von Neumann seems to have first clearly pointed out the conceptual
difficulties that arise when one attempts to formulate the physical process
underlying subjective observation within quantum theory [1]. He empha-
sized the latter’s incompatibility with a psycho-physical parallelism, the
traditional way of reducing the act of observation to a physical process.
Based on the assumption of a physical reality in space and time, one either
1 The first part of this article is the slightly revised version of a paper with the same
title that was informally circulated in 1981 by means of the Epistemological Letters of
the Ferdinand-Gonseth Association in Biel (Switzerland) as Letter No 63.0. (Therefore,
terms such as “new” or “recent” in this part refer to that year.) In its Conclusion, this
paper introduced the term “multi-consciousness interpretation” for a variant of the Everett
interpretation that has since been rediscovered several times (more or less independently),
and become known as the “many-minds interpretation” of quantum theory.
1
assumes a “coupling” (causal relationship — one-way or bidirectional) of
matter and mind, or disregards the whole problem by retreating to pure
behaviorism. However, even this may remain problematic when one at-
tempts to describe classical behavior in quantum mechanical terms. Neither
position can be upheld without fundamental modifications in a consistent
quantum mechanical description of the physical world.
These problems in formulating a process of observation within quantum
theory arise as a consequence of quantum nonlocality (quantum correlations
or “entanglement”, characterizing generic physical states), which in turn
may be derived from the superposition principle. This fundamental quantum
property does not even approximately allow the physical state of a local
system (such as the brain or parts thereof) to exist [2]. Hence, no state of
the mind can exist “parallel” to it (that is, correspond to it one-to-one or
determine it).
The question does not only concern the philosophical issue of matter and
mind. It has immediate bearing on quantum physics itself, as the state vec-
tor seems to suffer the well known reaction upon observation: its “collapse”.
For this reason Schro¨dinger once argued that the wave function might not
represent a physical object (not even in a statistical sense), but should rather
have a fundamental psycho-physical meaning.
This sitation appears so embarrassing to most physicists that many tried
hard to find a local reality behind the formalism of quantum theory. For
some time their effort was borne by the hope that quantum correlations
could be understood as statistical correlations arising from an unknown en-
semble interpretation of quantum theory. (An ensemble explanation within
quantum theory can be excluded [2].) However, Bell’s work has demon-
strated quite rigorously that any local reality — regardless of whether it can
be experimentally confirmed in principle or not — would necessarily be in
conflict with certain predictions of quantum theory. Less rigorous though
still quite convincing arguments had been known before in the form of the
dynamical completeness of the Schro¨dinger equation for describing isolated
microscopic systems, in particular those containing quantum correlations
(such as many-electron atoms).
Although the evidence in favor of quantum theory (and against local
realism) now appears overwhelming, the continuing search for a traditional
solution may be understandable in view of the otherwise arising epistemo-
logical problems. On the other hand, in the absence of any empirical hint
how to revise quantum theory, it may be wise to accept the description of
physical reality in terms of non-local state vectors, and to consider its se-
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vere consequences seriously. Such an approach may be useful regardless of
whether it will later turn out to be of limited validity.
The conventional (“Copenhagen”) pragmatic attitude of switching be-
tween classical and quantum concepts by means of ad hoc decisions does,
of course, not represent a consistent description. It should be distinguished
from that wave-particle duality which can be incorporated into the general
concept of a state vector (namely, the occupation number representation
for wave modes). Unfortunately, personal tendencies for local classical or
for non-local quantum concepts to describe “true reality” seem to form the
major source of misunderstandings between physicists — cf. the recent dis-
cussion between d’Espagnat and Weißkopf [4].
It appears evident that conscious awareness must in some way be cou-
pled to local physical systems: our physical environment has to interact
with and thereby influence our brains in order to be perceived. There is
even convincing evidence supporting the idea that all states of awareness
reflect physico-chemical processes in the brain. These neural processes are
usually described by means of classical (that is, local) concepts. One may
speculate about the details of this coupling on purely theoretical grounds
[5], or search for them experimentally by performing neurological and psy-
chological work. In fact, after a few decades of exorcizing consciousness from
psychobiology by retreating to pure behaviorism, the demon now seems to
have been allowed to return [6]. On closer inspection, however, the concept
of consciousness as used turns out to be a purely behavioristic one: certain
aspects of behavior (such as language) are rather conventionally associated
with consciousness. For epistemological reasons it is indeed strictly impos-
sible to derive the concept of subjective consiousness (awareness) from a
physical world. Nonetheless, subjectivity need not form an “epistemological
impasse” (Pribram’s term [7]), but to grasp it may require combined efforts
from physics, psychology and epistemology.
2 The Epistemology of Consciousness
By inventing his malicious demon, Descartes demonstrated the impossibility
of proving the reality of the observed (physical) world. This hypothetical
demon, assumed to delude our senses, may thereby be thought of as part of
(another) reality — similar to an indirect proof.
On the other hand, Descartes’ even more famous cogito ergo sum is
based on our conviction that the existence of subjective sensations cannot
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be reasonably doubted. Instead of forming an epistemological impasse, sub-
jectivity should thus be regarded as an epistemological gateway to reality.
Descartes’ demon does not disprove a real physical world — nor does any
other epistemological argument. Rather does it open up the possibility of a
hypothetical realism, for example in the sense of Vaihinger’s heuristic fictions
[8]. Aside from having to be intrinsically consistent, this hypothetical reality
has to agree with observations (perceptions), and describe them in the most
economical manner. If, in a quantum world, the relation between (ultimately
subjective) observations and postulated reality should turn out to differ from
its classical form (as has often been suggested for reasons of consistency),
new non-trivial insights may be obtained.
While according to Descartes my own sensations are beyond doubt to
me, I cannot prove other people’s consciousness even from the presumption
of their physical reality. (This was the reason for eliminating it from be-
havioristic psychology.) However, I may better (that is, more economically)
“understand” or predict others’ behavior (which I seem to observe in re-
ality) if I assume that they experience similar sensations as I do. In this
sense, consciousness (beyond solipsism) is a heuristic concept precisely as
reality. There is no better epistemological reason to exorcise from science
the concept of consciousness than that of physical reality.
A consequence of this heuristic epistemological construction of physical
and psychic reality is, of course, that language gives information about the
speaker’s consciousness. This argument emphasizes the epistemologically
derived (rather than dynamically emerged) nature of this concept. How-
ever, only that part of others’ consciousness can be investigated, that man-
ifests itself as some form of behavior (such as language). For this reason it
may indeed be appropriate to avoid any fundamental concept of conscious-
ness in psychobiology. This requires that conscious behavior (behavior as
though being conscious) can be completely explained as emerging — cer-
tainly a meaningful conjecture. It would have to include our private (sub-
jectively experienced) consciousness if a psycho-physical parallelism could
be established. Only for such a dynamically passive parallelism (or epi-
phenomenalism) would the physical world form a closed system that in
principle allowed complete reductionism.
Before the advent of quantum theory this ivory tower position of physics
could be upheld without posing problems. If, on the other hand, the nonlocal
quantum concepts describe real aspects of the physical world (that is, if they
are truly heuristic concepts), the parallelism has to be modified in some
way. Such a modification could some day even turn out to be important
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for experimental psychobiology, but it is irrelevant whenever nonlocality
can be neglected, as for present-day computers or most neural processes.
However, the quasi-classical activities of neurons may be almost as far from
consciousness as an image on the retina. The concept of “wholeness” —
often emphasized as being important for complex systems such as the brain
— is usually insufficiently understood: in quantum theory it is neither a
mere dynamical wholeness (that is, an efficient interaction between all parts)
nor is it restricted to the system itself. Dynamical arguments require a
kinematical wholeness of the entire universe (when regarded as composed
of spatial parts) [2]. It may be neglected for certain (“classical”) aspects
only — not for a complete microscopic description that may be relevant for
subjective perceptions.
3 Observing in a Quantum World
One possible consequence of these problems that inevitably arise in quantum
theory would be to abandon the heuristic and generally applicable concept
of a physical reality — explicitly [9] or tacitly. This suggestion includes the
usual restriction to formal rules when calculating probability distributions
of presumed classical variables in situations which are intuitively understood
as “measurements” (but insufficiently or even inconsistently distinguished
from normal “dynamical” interactions). Clearly, no general description of
physical processes underlying awareness could be given in the absence of a
physical reality, even though macroscopic behavior (including the dynamics
of neural systems) can be described by means of the usual pragmatic scheme.
This is quite unsatisfactory, since subjective awareness has most elementary
meaning without external observation (that would be required in the Copen-
hagen interpretation). Epistemologically, any concept of observation must
ultimately be based on an observing subject.
This “non-concept” of abandoning microscopic reality is not at all re-
quired, as has been pointed out before [2, 10]. Instead, one may regard the
state vector as “actual” and representing reality, since it acts dynamically
(often as a whole) on what is observed. Moreover, in view of Bell’s analysis
of the consequences of quantum nonlocality, it appears questionable whether
anything, and what, might be gained from inventing novel fundamental con-
cepts (hidden variables) without any empirical support. Two different solu-
tions of the measurement problem then appear conceivable: von Neumann’s
collapse or Everett’s relative state interpretation [11]. In both cases a (suit-
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ably modified) psycho-physical parallelism can be re-established.
A dynamical collapse of the wave function would require nonlinear and
nonunitary terms in the Schro¨dinger equation [12]. They may be extremely
small, and thus become effective only through practically irreversible ampli-
fication processes occurring during measurement-like events. The superpo-
sition principle would then be valid only in a linearized version of the theory.
While this suggestion may in principle explain quantum measurements, it
would not be able to describe definite states of concsiousness unless the
parallelism were restricted to quasi-classical variables in the brain. Since
nonlinear terms in the Schro¨dinger equation lead to observable deviations
from conventional quantum theory, they should at present be disregarded
for similar reasons as hidden variables. Any proposed violation of the su-
perposition principle must be viewed with great suspicion because of the
latter’s great and general success. For example, even superpositions of dif-
ferent vacua have proven heuristic (that is, to possess predictive power) in
quantum field theory.
The problems thus arising when physical states representing conscious-
ness are described within wave mechanics by means of nonlinear dynami-
cal terms could possibly be avoided if these nonlinearities were themselves
caused by consciousness. This has in fact been suggested as a way to incor-
porate a genuine concept of free will into the theory [13], but would be in
conflict with the hypothesis of a closed physical description of the world.
If the Schro¨dinger equation is instead assumed to be universal and ex-
act, superpositions of states of the brain representing different contents of
consciousness are as unavoidable as Schro¨dinger’s superposition of a dead
and alive cat. However, because of unavoidable interaction with the envi-
ronment, each component must then be quantum correlated with a different
(almost orthogonal) state of the rest of the universe. This consequence,
together with the way how we perceive the world, leads obviously to a
“many-worlds” interpretation of the wave function.2 Unfortunately this
name is misleading. The quantum world (described by a wave function)
would correspond to one superposition of myriads of components represent-
ing classically different worlds. They are all dynamically coupled (hence
“actual”), and they may in principle (re)combine as well as branch. It is
not the real world (described by a wave funtion) that branches in this pic-
2 Everett [11] suggested “branching” wave functions in order to discuss cosmology in
strictly quantum mechanical terms (without an external observer or a collapse). I was
later led to similar conclusions as a consequence of unavoidable quantum entanglement
[2] — initially knowing neither of Everett’s nor of Bell’s work.
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ture, but consciousness (or rather the state of its physical carrier), and with
it the observed (apparent) “world” [2]. Once we have accepted the formal
part of quantum theory, only our experience teaches us that consciousness
is physically determined by (factor) wave functions in certain components of
the total wave function.3 The existence of “other” components (with their
separate conscious versions of ourselves) is a heuristic fiction, based on the
assumption of a general validity of dynamical laws that have always been
confirmed when tested. When applied to classical laws and concepts, an
analogous assumptions leads to the conventional model of reality in space
and time as an extrapolation of what is observed. In the quantum model, a
collapse would represent a new kind of solipsism, since it denies the existence
of these otherwise arising consequences.
Everett related his branching to the practically irreversible dynamical
decoupling of components that occurs when microscopic properties become
correlated to macroscopic ones. This irreversibility requires specific initial
conditions for the global state vector [5]. Such initial conditions will then,
for example, also cause a sugar molecule to permanently send retarded “in-
formation” (by scattering photons and molecules) about its handedness into
the universe. In this way, their relative phases become nonlocal, and thus
cannot affect the physical states of local conscious observers (or states of
their brains) any more. The separation of these components is dynamically
“robust”. There is no precise localization of the branch cut (while a genuine
dynamical collapse would have to be specified as a dynamical law).
Nonetheless, Everett’s branching in terms of quasi-classical properties
does not appear sufficient to formulate a psycho-physical parallelism. Nei-
ther would this branching produce a definite factor state for some relevant
part of the brain, nor does every decoherence process somewhere in the uni-
verse describe conscious observation. Even within a robust branch, most
parts of the brain will remain strongly quantum correlated with one another
and with their environment.
Everett’s branchings represent objective measurements — not necessar-
ily conscious observations. A parallelism seems to be based on a far more
fine-grained branching (from a local point of view) than that describing mea-
surements, since it should correspond one-one to subjective awareness. The
3 It would always be possible to introduce additional (entirely arbitrary and unob-
servable) variables as a hypothetical link between the wave function and consciousness.
Given their (hypothetical) dynamics, the required quantum probabilities can then be pos-
tulated by means of appropriate initial conditions. An example are the classical variables
in Bohm’s pilot wave theory [14].
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conjecture here is: does the (not necessarily robust) branching that is con-
ceptually required for defining the parallelism then readily justify Everett’s
(apparently objective) branching into quasi-classical worlds?
The branching of the global state vector Ψ with respect to two differ-
ent conscious observers (A and B, say) may be written in their Schmidt-
canonical forms [5],
Ψ =
∑
nA
cAnAχ
A
nA
φAnA =
∑
nB
cBnBχ
B
nB
φBnB , (1)
where χA,B are states of the respective physical carriers of consciousness
(presumably small but not necessarily local parts of the central nervous
system), while φA,B are states of the respective “rests of the universe”. In
order to describe the macroscopic behavior of (human) observers, one has to
consider the analogous representation with respect to the states χ˜ of their
whole bodies (or relevant parts thereof),
Ψ =
∑
kA
c˜AkAχ˜
A
kA
φ˜AkA =
∑
kB
c˜BkB χ˜
B
kB
φ˜BkB . (2)
In particular, the central nervous system may be assumed to possess (usually
unconscious) “memory states” (labelled bymA andmB , say) which are simi-
larly robust under decoherence as the handedness of a sugar molecule. Time-
directed quantum causality (based on the initial condition for the global wave
function) will then force the Schmidt states χ˜A and χ˜B to approximately
factorize in terms of these memory states [15],
Ψ⇒
∑
mAµA
c˜AmAµA χ˜
A
mAµA
φ˜AmAµA ≈
∑
mBµB
c˜BmBµB χ˜
B
mBµB
φ˜BmBµB , (3)
where µA and µB are additional quantum numbers. The “rest of the uni-
verse” thus serves as a sink for phase relations.
In general, the robust quantum numbers mA and mB will be partly cor-
related — either because of special interactions between the two oberservers
(communication), or since they have arisen from the same cause (that is,
from observations of the same event). These correlations define the concept
of objectivization in quantum mechanical terms.
The genuine carriers of consciousness (described by the states χ in (1))
must not in general be expected to represent memory states, as there do
not seem to be permanent contents of consciousness. However, since they
may be assumed to interact directly with the rest of the χ˜-system only, and
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since phase relations between different quantum numbers mA or mB would
immediately become nonlocal, memory appears “classical” to the conscious
observer. Each robust branch in (2), hence also each m-value, describes
essentially an independent partial sum of type (1) when observed [16]. The
emprirically relevant probability interpretation in terms of quasi-classical
branches (including pointer positions) may, therefore, be derived from a
similar (but fundamental) one for the subjective branching (with respect to
each observer) that according to this interpretation defines the novel psycho-
physical parallelism.
As mentioned before, macroscopic behavior (including behavior as though
being conscious) could also be described by means of the pragmatic (probal-
istic) rules of quantum theory. An exact Schro¨dinger equation does not
imply deterministic behavior of conscious beings, since one has to expect
that macroscopic stimuli have microscopic effects in the brain before they
cause macroscopic behavior. Thereby, interaction with the environment
will intervene. Everett’s “relative state” decomposition (1) with respect
to the subjective observer state χ may then considerably differ from the
objectivized branching (3), that would be meaningful with respect to all
conceivable “external” observations. This description may even put definite
meaning into Bohr’s vague concept of complementarity.
4 Conclusion
The multi-universe interpretation of quantum theory (which should rather
be called amulti-consciousness interpretation) seems to be the only interpre-
tation of a universal quantum theory (with an exact Schro¨dinger equation)
that is compatible with the way the world is perceived. However, because
of quantum nonlocality it requires an appropriate modification of the tradi-
tional epistemological postulate of a psycho-physical parallelism.
In this interpretation, the physical world is completely described by Ev-
erett’s wave function that evolves deterministically (Laplacean). This global
quantum state then defines an indeterministic (hence “branching”) succes-
sion of states for all observers. Therefore, the world itself appears indeter-
ministic — subjective in principle, but largely objectivized through quantum
correlations (entanglement).
This quite general scheme to describe the empirical world is conceptually
consistent (even though the parallelism remains vaguely defined), while it is
based on the presently best founded physical concepts. The latter may some
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day turn out to be insufficient, but it is hard to see how any future theory
that contains quantum theory in some approximation may avoid similar
epistemological problems. These problems arise from the contrast between
quantum nonlocality (confirmed by Bell’s analysis as part of reality) and
the locality of consciousness “somewhere in the brain”. Quantum concepts
should be better founded than classical ones for approaching these problems.
5 Addendum
The above-presented paper of 1981 has here been rewritten (with minor
changes, mainly regarding formulations), since the solution of the quantum
mechanical measurement problem proposed therein has recently gained in-
terest, while the Epistemological Letters (which were used as an informal
discussion forum between physicists and philosophers interested in the “new
quantum debate”) are now hard to access. The dynamical dislocalization
of phase relations (based on [2, 15]) referred to in this article in order to
justify robust Everett branches has since become better known as decoher-
ence (see [17]), while the “multi-consciousness interpretation” mentioned in
the Conclusion has been rediscovered on several occasions. It is now usually
discussed as a “many-minds interpretation” [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], but has
also been called a “many-views” [24] or “many-perceptions” interpretation
[25].
The conjectured quasi-classical nature of those dynamical states of neu-
rons in the brain which may carry memory or can be investigated “from
outside” has recently been confirmed by quantitative estimates of their de-
coherence in an important paper by Tegmark [26]. To most of these states,
however, the true physical carrier of consciousness somewhere in the brain
may still represent an external observer system, with whom they have to in-
teract in order to be perceived. Regardless of whether the ultimate observer
systems are quasi-classical or possess essential quantum aspects, conscious-
ness can only be related to factor states (of systems assumed to be localized
in the brain) that appear in branches (robust components) of the global
wave function — provided the Schro¨dinger equation is exact. Environmen-
tal decoherence represents entanglement (but not any “distortion” — of the
brain, in this case), while ensembles of wave functions, representing vari-
ous potential (unpredictable) outcomes, would require a dynamical collapse
(that has never been observed).4
4 A collapse would be conceivable as well in Bohm’s theory, where memory and objec-
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An essential role of the conscious observer for the occurrence of funda-
mental (though objective) quantum events was apparently suggested already
by Heisenberg in his early “idealistic” interpretation of a particle trajectory
coming into being by our act of observing it. Bohr, in his later Copenhagen
interpretation, insisted instead that classical outcomes arise in the apparatus
during irreversible measurements, which he assumed not to be dynamically
analyzable in terms of a microscopic reality (cf. Beller [27]). This first classi-
cal link in the chain of interactions that forms the observation of a quantum
system can now be identified with the first occurrence of decoherence (glob-
ally described as a unitary but practically irreversible dynamical process —
see [28]).
However, Bohr’s restriction of the applicability of quantum concepts as
well as Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations were meant to establish bounds to
a rational description of Nature. (The popular simplistic view of quantum
theory as merely describing stochastic dynamics for an otherwise classical
world leads to the well known wealth of “paradoxes”, which rule out any
local description but have all been derived from the superposition principle,
that is, ultimately from an entangled global wave function.) Von Neumann’s
“orthodox” interpretation, on the other hand, is somewhat obscured by his
use of observables, which should have no fundamental place in a theory of
interacting wave functions. His postulate of a dynamical collapse represent-
ing conscious observations was later elaborated upon by London and Bauer
[29], while Wigner [13] suggested an active influence of the mind on the
physical state (that should better not affect objectively measurable proba-
bilities). Stapp [21] expressed varying views on this problem, while Penrose
[30] speculated that human thinking, in contrast to classical computers, re-
quires genuine quantum aspects (including superpositions of neuronal states
and the collapse of the wave function).5
The Everett interpretation leads to its “extravagant” (unfamiliar and
unobservable) consequences, because it does not invent any new laws, vari-
ables or irrational elements for the sole purpose of avoiding them. Lockwood
tive thought seems to be still described by neuronal quantum states, rather than by the
classical configurations which according to Bell [14] would have to describe physical states
corresponding to consciousness.
5 There seems to be a certain confusion between logical statements (that is, tautolo-
gies), which have no implicit relation to the concept of time, and algorithmic procedures,
performed in time in order to prove them. (Undecidable formal statements are mean-
ingless, and hence not applicable.) A dynamical collapse of the wave function must not
be regarded as representing “quantum logic” (or “logic of time”). This misconception
appears reminiscent of the popular confusion of cause and reason.
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[19] is quite correct when he points out the essential role of decoherence for
the many-minds interpretation (see also [23]). This unavoidable “continuous
measurement” of all macroscopic systems by their environments (inducing
entanglement) was indeed initially discussed [2] precisely in order to support
the concept of a universal wave function, in which “branching components”
must be separately experienced.
Heisenberg once recalled [31] that Einstein had told him (my transla-
tion): “Only the theory may tell us what we can observe. . . . On the whole
long path (ganzer langer Weg) from the event to its registration in our
consciousness you have to know how Nature works.” Einstein did thus not
suggest that the theory has to postulate “observables” for this purpose (as
the first part of this quotation is often understood). Formal observables are
useful only since the subsequent part of this chain of interactions can for all
practical purposes be described in terms of classical variables, after initial
values have been stochastically created for them somewhere in the chain.
However, most physicists would now agree on what to do (in principle) if
quantum effects should be relevant during some or all intermediary steps
(cf. [32]): they would have to calculate the evolution of the corresponding
series of entangled quantum systems, taking into account decoherence by
the environment where required. There is then no need for genuine classical
variables anywhere, since Tegmark’s decohered neuronal (quantum) states
form an appropriate “pointer basis” for the application of quantum prob-
abilities. These probabilities need not characterize a stochastic dynamical
process (a collapse of the wave function), but would describe an objectiviz-
able splitting of the (state of the) mind if the Schro¨dinger equation were
exact. In Bohm’s quantum theory, on the other hand, states of the mind
would be related to “surreal” classical trajectories which are guided by —
hence would be aware of — a branch wave function only [14].
Therefore, I feel that the Heisenberg-Bohr picture of quantum mechanics
can now be claimed dead. Neither classical concepts, nor any uncertainty
relations, complementarity, observables, quantum logic, quantum statistics,
or quantum jumps have to be introduced on a fundamental level (see also
Sect. 4.6 of [28]). In a recent experiment [33], interference experiments were
performed with mesoscopic molecules, and proposed for small virus. Time
may be ripe to discuss the consequences of similar Gedanken experiments
with objects carrying some primitive form of “core consciousness” [34] —
including an elementary awareness of their path through the slits. How can
“many minds” be avoided if their coherence can be restored?
I wish to thank Erich Joos for various helpful comments.
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